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MARTYRS FOR A CAUSE:
How ERISA's ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION HAS
BEEN MISINTERPRETED TO DISADVANTAGE THOSE WHO
PROPERLY REPORT EMPLOYER WRONGDOING
Stacey L. Wagner*
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (hereinafter ERISA) is a
comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. ERISA protects the interests of
participants and beneficiaries in private-sector employee benefit plans.' ERISA
does not mandate that employers maintain pension or retirement plans, but it
regulates those that are implemented by employers.4 The fiduciary standards
dictated by ERISA include those related to participation, meaning who must be
covered, vesting, meaning how long a person must work in order to be entitled to a
pension, and funding, meaning how much must be set aside each year in order to
pay future pensions.5 ERISA consists of four titles.6 Title I covers welfare benefit
and pension plans established or maintained by employers in the private sector.7
Title II of ERISA contains and expands on the Internal Revenue Code provisions.8
Title III of ERISA assigns to the Departments of Labor and the Treasury the
responsibilities of enforcing the provisions of ERISA.9 Finally, Title IV of the Act
establishes the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.' 0 The statute imposes
participation, funding, and vesting requirements on pension plans.11 Furthermore, it
sets various uniform standards, including rules concerning reporting, disclosure,
*1 would like to thank Professor Barbara Fick for her guidance and wealth of knowledge regarding the
intricate world of labor and employment law. I would also like to thank Joe Callaghan for his eternal support;
the ideal colleague, classmate, and future husband.
1. P. L. 93 -406, 88 Stat. 829 (Sept. 2, 1974). (ERISA is codified at §§ 1001 to 1453 of title 29, United
States Code and in §§ 401-415 and 4972-4975 in the Internal Revenue Code.)
2. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
3. PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT
OF 1974 (ERISA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 7-5700. Available at
www.crs.gov (2009).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id at 48.
9. Id. at 55.
10. Id. at 56.
11. Id. at 56.
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and fiduciary responsibility for both pension and welfare plans. 12
As a part of this system, "Congress included various safeguards to preclude
abuse and 'to completely secure the rights and expectations brought into being by
this landmark reform legislation."' 13 The main safeguard ensured by ERISA is
section 510, the anti-retaliation provision.14 Therein, the Act provides insulation
from retaliatory measures for employees who expose the company for which they
work for various violations of the ERISA statute. Similar statutes can be found in
both the Equal Rights Act of 1964 as well as the Fair Labor Standards Act. 16
In determining the proper scope of the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA, the
circuit courts have developed a split as to whether or not unsolicited, internal
complaints to management regarding alleged violations of the statute are protected
by this provision.17 The first two circuits to tackle this interpretive issue held that
such allegations are properly insulated from employer retaliation, while the final
three all found that these types of complaints are not, in fact, protected by ERISA
section 510. However, with the proper analogizing to the very similar anti-
retaliation found in the Fair Labor Standards Act, taken in conjunction with the
Congressional motivation for passing the Act, it is evident that the first two courts
to consider the proper scope of ERISA section 510 more correctly characterized this
provision.
In Part I of this essay, I will explore the Congressional motivations behind the
enactment of ERISA. I will discuss the current legislation in light of the failed
Welfare and Pensions Plans Disclosure Act, which served as ERISA's predecessor.
I will also examine ERISA's anti-retaliation provision, enacted to shield employees
from employer retaliation if the employee exposes the employer's ERISA
violations. In Part II, I will examine the judicial interpretation of ERISA and the
resulting circuit split regarding the proper reading of the anti-retaliation provision.
Finally, in Part III, I will discuss the practical implications of interpreting the anti-
retaliation provision as not extending to unsolicited, internal employee complaints
to management, especially when read in conjunction with the similarly-worded but
conceptually separated anti-retaliation provision located in the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which was augmented in 2010.19
12. Id. at 7.
13. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990).
14. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
15. Id.
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -3(a) (1969); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §
218c (2010).
17. See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5h Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii,
999 F.2d 408 (9f Cir. 1993) (both courts holding that the anti-retaliation provisions of § 510 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act protects employees from termination following an internal, unsolicited
complaint to management regarding alleged ERISA violations); But see King v. Marriott Int'l. Inc., 337 F.3d
421 (4th Cir. 2003); Nicolau v. Horizon Media Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); Edwards v. A. H. Cornell &
Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (all maintaining the opposing approach, asserting that the plain
language of § 510 of ERISA only protects against retaliation following reports that were ascertained pursuant
to an "inquiry" or "proceeding").
18. Id.
19. Although the anti-retaliation provision that was added to the Fair Labor Standards Act in 2010 relates
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I. ERISA's HISTORY
ERISA was enacted following the failure of The Welfare and Pensions Plans
Disclosure Act20 wherein the Congress required public disclosure of pension plan
finances. It was evident that this greater transparency did not necessarily translate to
a lack of misuse of pension funds by employers when the Studebaker automobile
company terminated its underfunded pension plan in 1963, leaving several thousand
workers and retirees without the pensions that they had been previously promised
by their employer.21 This revealed the necessity of Congressional protection of such
pensions and employee benefits.
During the early 1970s, both the Senate and the House of Representatives
drafted legislation aimed at greater regulation of the private pension system.22 The
final version of ERISA passed in 1974 included elements from the Senate and the
House Labor Committees, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate
Finance Committee, and was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on Labor
Day - September 2, 1974.23 According to the United States Department of Labor,
the number of persons benefitting from ERISA has grown from 11,507,000 in 1975
to 79,849,000 in 2006.24
The Anti-Retaliation Provision ofERISA
ERISA is a long and complex body of legislation, rich with opportunity for
judicial interpretation. However, the section of the Act that has become the center
of the most judicial controversy over the past seventeen years has been section 510:
the anti-retaliation provision. 25 This provision is codified at 29 U.S.C. section 1140,
and is entitled "Interference with protected rights."26 This section provides that:
to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, its placement within the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
language chosen by Congress are indicative of the turning of the Congressional tides to comport with the
thesis of this note.
20. P. L. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (Aug. 29, 1958).
21. PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT
OF 1974 (ERISA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 7-5700. Available at
www.crs.gov (2009).
22. Id at 2.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id at 4.
25. See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5t Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii,
999 F.2d 408 (9' Cir. 1993) (both courts holding that the anti-retaliation provisions of § 510 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act protects employees from termination following an internal, unsolicited
complaint to management regarding alleged ERISA violations); But see King v. Marriott Int'l. Inc., 337 F.3d
421 (4th Cir. 2003); Nicolau v. Horizon Media Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); Edwards v. A. H. Cornell &
Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (all maintaining the opposing approach, asserting that the plain
language of § 510 of ERISA only protects against retaliation following reports that were ascertained pursuant
to an "inquiry" or "proceeding").
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974).
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It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an
employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act [29 U.S.C.A. section 301 et
seq.], or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to
which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this
subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be
unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate
against any person because he has given information or has testified or is
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. In the case of a multiemployer
plan, it shall be unlawful for the plan sponsor or any other person to
discriminate against any contributing employer for exercising rights under
this chapter or for giving information or testifying in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to this chapter before Congress. The provisions of
section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of this
21
section.
This section was enacted in order to keep employers from punishing employees
or beneficiaries for reporting violations of the Act. Without such a provision,
employers would effectively be permitted to bypass any responsibility resulting
from disregarding ERISA simply by discharging any employee who reports a
violation. Because of ERISA section 510, employees are safeguarded to an extent.
However, because this provision juxtaposes language indicating that protection is
afforded for any employee who provides information regarding ERISA violations
with that indicating that an employee is insulated from retaliation resulting from his
or her testimony in any inquiry or proceeding, the courts have split on whether
unsolicited, internal accounts of such violations offered to managers are protected
from retaliation. The fifth and ninth circuits were the first to wrestle with this
concept.28 Therein, both courts determined that such unsolicited, internal
complaints were protected from retaliation pursuant to section 510 of ERISA.29
However, in three more recent opinions, the fourth, second, and third circuits have
disagreed with this initial impression of the proper interpretation of the anti-
retaliation provision of ERISA. 30 In those cases, the courts departed from the notion
that such unsolicited, internal complaints were intended to be protected by this
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., I1 F.3d 1311 (5"' Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii,
999 F.2d 408 (9" Cir. 1993) (both courts holding that the anti-retaliation provisions of § 510 of ERISA
protects employees from termination following an internal, unsolicited complaint to management regarding
alleged ERISA violations).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1979).
30. King v. Marriott Int'l. Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Nicolau v. Horizon Media Inc., 402 F.3d
325 (2d Cir. 2005); Edwards v. A. H. Cornell & Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (all asserting that the
plain language of § 510 of ERISA only protects against retaliation following reports that were ascertained
pursuant to an "inquiry" or "proceeding").
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provision, given the plain language of the act affording protection from reported
violations that were procured pursuant to an inquiry or proceeding.3'
11. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION OF ERISA
The language that could be interpreted to indicate that the insulation from
retaliation only applies to disclosures rendered in an inquiry or proceeding initially
seemed to be irrelevant based on two circuit court cases from the mid-1990s.32 Both
the fifth circuit in Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. and the ninth circuit in
Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii determined that these types of disclosures were
within the spirit and purpose of the anti-retaliation clause of ERISA.3 3
Unfortunately for employees who feel compelled to report violations of ERISA
without being specifically questioned or prompted, the tide turned in the following
ten years, with the fourth, second, and third circuits all focusing much more heavily
on the plain language of the statute, strictly constructing the meaning of "inquiry or
proceeding." 34
The Ninth Circuit: Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii (1993)
The first court to address the purpose behind the anti-retaliation provision of
ERISA was the ninth circuit in 1993.35 In that case, Jessica Hashimoto originally
brought the action against her former employer under the Hawaii whistle-blower
statute. The statute read in relevant part,
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise
discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's
compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of
employment because: (1) The employee, or a person acting on
behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report to a public
body, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a
law or rule adopted pursuant to law of this State, a political
subdivision of this State, or the United States, unless the employee
knows that the report is false. 36
3 1. Id.
32. Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5h Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999
F.2d 408 (9 " Cir. 1993).
33. Id.
34. King v. Marriott Int'l. Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Nicolau v. Horizon Media Inc., 402 F.3d
325 (2d Cir. 2005); Edwards v. A. H. Cornell & Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
35. Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408 (9" Cir. 1993).
36. Hawaii Whistle-Blowers Protection Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 378-62 (2010). It is important to note
that the statute under which the plaintiff initially brought this action did not delineate any difference between
a person who makes such disclosures pursuant to an investigation or proceeding and those who raise such
concerns internally or those who do so without being solicited for such information.
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Hashimoto asserted that on several different occasions between April 1989 and
October 12, 1990, she had complained to her immediate supervisor and his superior
about "potential and/or actual violations by the Bank of the reporting and disclosure
requirements of ERISA." 37 The specific catalyst for these allegations was
Hashimoto's contention that her supervisor had directed her to reimburse a former
employee from a profit-sharing plan for taxes that that Hashimoto had "properly
withheld a lump sum distribution" of his account. 38 Furthermore, Hashimoto
claimed that a different supervisor had instructed that she recalculate another
employee's pension plan benefit and to use final pay rather than final average pay,
which is violative of ERISA regulations. 39 In sum, Hashimoto claimed that her
termination was a direct result of her internal, unsolicited complaints to her two
immediate supervisors that the company had engaged in violations of ERISA's
dictates regarding the Bank's pension plan, profit-sharing plan, and severance
plan.40 The Bank asserted that this claim was preempted by ERISA, as Hashimoto
brought the claim under the Hawaii whistle-blower statute, and that there were
applicable portions of ERISA that were implicated by her contentions.41
The ninth circuit noted that the breadth of preemption under ERISA is
extraordinarily broad. Specifically, the court stated that any time a claim "relates
to" an employee benefit plan the opportunities for preemption are vast.42 In this
case, the court determined that the state law was, in fact, preempted, as it
encroached on the relationships regulated by ERISA, further noting that employee
transactions carried out to avoid benefit payments are exclusively federal in
nature. 43 Most importantly for the purposes of this essay, the court in the ninth
circuit determined that the case must be remanded and considered under section 510
- the anti-retaliation provision - of ERISA. 44 The court specifically mentioned 29
U.S.C. section 1140 as providing the requisite remedies for a "whistle-blower,"
asserting that "This statute was clearly meant to protect whistle-blowers." 45
Moreover, the court posited that the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA "may be
fairly construed to protect a person in Hashimoto's position, in fact, she was fired
because she was protesting a violation of law in connection with an ERISA plan."46
Thus, in this, the seminal case regarding the proper interpretation of the anti-
retaliation provision of the ERISA statute, the court explicitly noted that the
provision properly and neatly applies to someone in the position of the plaintiff,
37. Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408, 409 (9" Cir. 1993).
38. Id. at 410.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Though ultimately the case was remanded for consideration under § 510 of the ERISA statute, the
defendants did not intentionally call for this remand in order to assert that the claim had no merit because it
was an unsolicited, internal complaint to management rather than an allegation that came about as a result of
an inquiry or proceeding, as did defendants in later matters discussed in this essay.
42. Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408, 410 -411 (9t' Cir. 1993).
43. Id. at411.
44. Id.
45. Id. (29 U.S.C. § 1140 is the codification of§ 510 of ERISA.)
46. Id. (emphasis added).
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Hashimoto. More specifically, the court implicitly determined that the anti-
retaliation provision applies to someone who rendered unsolicited, internal
complaints of violations of ERISA regulations to his or her immediate supervisors.
This disclosure was not rendered pursuant to an inquiry or proceeding, and the court
in the ninth circuit did not deem this distinction important. In fact, the court decided
entirely contrary to this notion, indicating that this disclosure would be specifically
protected under section 510 of ERISA. 4 7 Most importantly, the court in Hashimoto
comprehended and dictated the functional difficulties that would be associated with
failing to protect unsolicited, internal complaints of ERISA violations.48 In so
doing, the court asserted that,
The normal first step in giving information or testifying in any way
that might tempt an employer to discharge one would be to present the
problem first to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan. If one is then
discharged for raising the problem, the process of giving information or
testifying is interrupted at its start: the anticipatory discharge discourages
the whistle blower before the whistle is blown. 49
This most aptly summarizes the functional impossibilities associated with
allowing protection from retaliation only to employees who have participated in
some sort of an "inquiry or proceeding" rather than those who rendered the
requisite information of their own volition.
The Fifth Circuit: Anderson v. Electric Data Systems Corporation (1994)
The following year, the fifth circuit was similarly faced with an interpretive
issue relating to the scope of the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA. In that case,
George Anderson brought an action in state court against his former employer,
Electric Data Systems Corporation, alleging wrongful discharge, tortious
interference with prospective business and contractual relationships, and infliction
of emotional distress. This case, similar to the Hashimoto case previously
discussed, was rightfully removed to federal court, as the state claims were
preempted by the relevant portions of the ERISA statute. 51
Anderson had been employed by Electric Data Systems Corporation from
October 1984 through October 1985, serving as the company's Cash Manager in
the Treasurer's Department where his responsibilities included management of all
cash operations, short term investing, and cash forecasting. 52 Anderson alleged that
he was demoted and subsequently discharged for failing to commit illegal acts and
for reporting the activities of another employee, Douglas Crow, one of Anderson's
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5" Cir. 1994).
51. Id. at 1312.
52. Id.
134 [Vol. 38:1
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immediate supervisors. 53 Two of the illegal acts that were allegedly demanded of
Anderson and which implicated Crow in the ERISA violations involved Electric
Data Systems Pension plans. 54 Specifically, Anderson was asked to sign off on the
approval or payment invoices on behalf of the pension portfolios under his
management and supervision which had been retained by Crow without the
approval of the pension trustees.5 5 Such action is violative of the relevant ERISA
provisions governing the proper management of such pension plans.56 Anderson
further asserted that he was asked to write up minutes for meetings that he did not
attend in connection with the Electric Data Systems Corp. retirement plan, which is
also violative of ERISA. 57 Anderson refused to commit these acts and subsequently
reported them to management. Following these disclosures, Anderson was
demoted and then discharged because of his "refusal to commit illegal activities at
Crow's request and because of his reporting Crow's own illegal or irregular
activities to EDS Management." 59
The fifth circuit, in determining that the state action was preempted by the
ERISA statute, noted that section 510, the anti-retaliation provision, conflicts
directly with the state wrongful discharge law, due to the fact that it was "carefully
crafted" to expressly provide recourse for enforcing ERISA.60 The court went on to
assert that Anderson's claims "[fell] squarely within the ambit of ERISA section
510" because "section 510 addresses discharges for exercising ERISA rights or for
the purpose of interfering with the attainment of ERISA rights, as well as
discharges for providing information or testimony relating to ERISA." 6'
Importantly, in this case the court found that the state action was preempted
because Anderson's activities fell "squarely" within the purview of section 510
without reference to the fact that Anderson had rendered these disclosures of his
own volition and without any prompting or persuading. Furthermore, these
allegations were not pursuant to any type of inquiry or proceeding, but rather were
raised internally and were unsolicited.62 The court did not focus on the language of
the anti-retaliation provision that discusses an "inquiry or proceeding," but rather
looked to the nature and the functional purpose of ERISA section 510.63 In fact, the
court explicitly stated that section 510 of ERISA "broadly prohibits the termination
or other adverse treatment of participants and beneficiaries for exercising their
ERISA rights or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of such rights,
and prohibits the discharge or other adverse treatment of any person because he has
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1313.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 1312.
63. Id
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given information or testimony relating to ERISA." 64 Finally, the court concluded
its analysis by asserting that the ERISA preemption provision is "deliberately
expansive" and is to be construed "extremely broadly."65 Though that particular
passage refers to the ability to preempt state law rather than the anti-retaliation
provision explicitly, the idea that the ERISA statute should be interpreted broadly is
one which has been echoed throughout many courts and initially dictated by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 66
Unfortunately for whistle-blowers like Hashimoto or employees who feel they
are doing the right thing by exposing ERISA violations such as Anderson, in the
years following these two landmark decisions other circuits have departed from this
expansive and inclusive understanding of the proper interpretation of section 510 of
the ERISA statute in favor of a literal construction focused on one clause of the
anti-retaliation provision taken in isolation.67
The Fourth Circuit: King v. Marriott International Incorporated (2003)
In King v. Marriott International Incorporated, the first case to hold that the
anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA statute does not protect against complaints
of ERISA violations that are rendered outside of a structured inquiry or proceeding
about such violations, Karen King, much like her predecessors Hashimoto and
Anderson, brought a state claim for wrongful discharge of employment.68 King was
employed by Marriott's benefits department for many years.69 She was known as a
very good employee until 1999 when she learned that her supervisor had
recommended that Marriott transfer millions of dollars from its medical plan into its
general corporate reserve account. 70 King doubted the appropriateness of this
transfer and expressed her concern both to her co-workers as well as her supervisor
who had ordered the transfer. 7 1 The following year, King was put in charge of the
company's benefit plan finances. 72 She noticed the re-emergence of the previously
mentioned transfer plan and again objected, fearing that the transfer was an ERISA
violation.73 King registered this objection with her supervisor, the person
authorizing the transfers, and even went so far as to request an opinion letter from
64. Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
65. Id quoting Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1328 (5a Cir. 1992).
66. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (indicating that the preemption
provisions of ERISA should be widely applied to state law. Courts interpreting this decision have noted that
the Supreme Court's intention was to widely apply the ERISA statute, without explicit reference to the
preemption provisions, as is noted in the Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. decision discussed above).
67. See King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Nicolau v. Horizon Media Inc., 402
F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); Edwards v. A. H. Cornell & Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (all maintaining
that the plain language of § 510 of ERISA only protects against retaliation following reports that were
ascertained pursuant to an "inquiry" or "proceeding").
68. King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 422 (4" Cir. 2003).
69. Id. at 423.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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one of the company's in house attorneys. 74 King protested to one last transfer of
funds from the company's medical plan and was fired within three months.75 The
company claimed that this discharge was due to King's on-going feud with a fellow
employee, but King was convinced that her reporting and objecting to the several
transfers was the true catalyst for her termination.76
The fourth circuit determined, as did the ninth circuit and the fifth circuit before
it, that the state law claim brought by King was properly preempted by the ERISA
statute and should thus be brought in federal court. However, the fourth circuit
departed from the previous construction of the anti-retaliation provision of the
ERISA statute. While liberally construing the preemption provisions of ERISA, the
court chose to contemplate a stricter and more literal approach with regard to
section 510 thereof.77 The court correctly noted that the only portion of section 510
possibly applicable to King is the sentence barring the "discharge of any person
because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry
or proceeding relating to this chapter."7 However, instead of determining like the
ninth circuit in Hoshimoto that King is the type of person meant to be protected by
the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA statute, or like the fourth circuit in
Anderson that the defendant's activities fell "squarely" within the purview of the
spirit of section 510, the court in King asserted that "The most immediate question
is the proper scope of the phrase 'inquiry or proceeding'."79
The court in the fourth circuit determined that the proper scope of the phrase
utilized in the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA was that it referred only to an
administrative or legal proceeding. In so determining, the court looked to its
construction of a "very similar provision" found in the Fair Labor Standards Act.8'
The court determined that a "proceeding" did not refer to the making of an intra-
company complaint.82 Rather, the fourth circuit explained that "testify" and
"institute" both connoted "a formality that does not attend an employee's oral
complaint to his supervisor." In so determining, the court looked to its decision in
Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q wherein it contemplated the language of the FLSA. 83 In
that case, the court concluded that the language employed in the FLSA's anti-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 424.
78. Id. at 426.
79. Id. at 427.
80. Id.
81. See The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938) (". . it shall be unlawful for any person -
... to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because such employee has filed a
complaint or caused to be initiated any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about
to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee").
82. See Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4"' Cir. 2000) (in that case, the fourth circuit
noted that the "proceeding" necessary for liability. . refers to procedures conducted in judicial or
administrative tribunals," noting that a "proceeding" in the Fair Labor Standards Act was "modified by
attributes of administrative or court proceedings.")
83. King v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4t Cir. 2003) quoting Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q
Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4 th Cir. 2000).
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retaliation provision was narrower than that found in the anti-retaliation provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which the court read to counsel a
narrower interpretation of the scope of the FLSA's protection against employer
retaliation.84 The court analogized the wording "testified or is about to testify" used
in the Fair Labor Standards Act with the wording "inquiry or proceeding" found in
ERISA.85 Because the court had interpreted the former wording as applicable only
to an administrative or legal proceeding, the court in King determined that the
wording in section 510 of ERISA is "limited to the legal or administrative, or at
least to something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a
supervisor."86 The court went on to take liberties with the phrase "given
information" found in the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA, asserting that this
language is present for the sole purpose of allowing non-testimonial information,
such as incriminating documents, to be covered by the provision.87 This, however,
is not asserted or implied anywhere in the text of section 510 of the ERISA
statute.88
It is important to note not only the linguistic similarities, but also the important
discrepancies that currently exist between the anti-retaliation provision in the FLSA
and that contained in ERISA. Although the fourth circuit in King determined that
the two were essentially identical as they read in 2003, Congress has subsequently
augmented the FLSA to include a provision that more definitively conceptually
separates an employee who "gives information" to his or her employer and one who
testifies in an inquiry or proceeding, as well as to add language that is even more
analogous to that found in ERISA.89 The current structure of the language found in
the FLSA, therefore, seems to indicate that an employee who gives information
regarding an alleged violation is as insulated from retaliation as one who testifies or
is about to testify in a proceeding. Subsection (2) of the FLSA explains that an
employee is protected from retaliation on the part of an employer when he or she:
"provided, caused to be provided or is about to provide or cause to be provided to
the employer, the Federal Government, or the attorney general of a State
information relating to any violation of or any act or omission the employee
reasonably believes to be a violation of any provision of this title." 90 It is not until
the following subsection that the Congress mentions testimony, providing
protection for any employee if he or she "testified or is about to testify in a
84. Id.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Id.
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 1440 (1974).
89. See The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (2010) ("No employer shall discharge or in
any manner discriminate against any employee with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or
other privileges of employment because the employee (or individual acting at the request of the employee)
has. . . (2) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide or cause to be provided to the employer, the
Federal Government, or the attorney general of a State information relating to any violation of, or any act or
omission the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of, any provision of this title (or amendment
made by this title); (3) testified or is about to testify in a proceeding concerning such violation; assisted or
participated, or is about to assist or participate in such a proceeding. . )
90. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (2) (2010) (emphasis added).
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proceeding concerning such violation."91 The court in King attempted to explain the
difference between the two concepts by asserting that giving information relating to
any violation of the FLSA means rendering physical documents that might be
relevant to such violations, asserting that "The phrase 'gives information' does no
more than to ensure that even the provision of non-testitimonial information (such
as incriminating documents) in an inquiry or proceeding would be covered."92
However, nothing in the language or the spirit of the FLSA suggests that this is the
case. If such an interpretation was intended by Congress, there would seemingly be
some reference thereto, or perhaps the wording might read, "an information" rather
than merely protecting an employee who gives information. Furthermore, the fact
that the FLSA allows for protection for an employee who gives such information to
his or her employer directly suggests that internal, unsolicited complaints to
management regarding violations of the FLSA would, in fact, be insulated from
retaliation by the employer. 93
While I believe that the comparison between the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act is, indeed, appropriate, I believe that
the fourth circuit misinterpreted the spirit, as well as the explicit language, of the
FLSA. The language used in ERISA does mirror that used in the FLSA.94
Additionally, although the two incidents of protection are not separated into
subsections in ERISA as they currently are in section 218c of the FLSA, ERISA
does provide protection from employer retaliation for an employee who ". . has
given information or has testified or is about to testify in an inquiry or
proceeding." 95 To interpret this passage as if there is no conceptual separation
between an employee who renders information and one who testifies in an inquiry
or proceeding is to give a cursory understanding to the passage. Furthermore, if the
linguistic analogy between the FLSA and ERISA is, indeed, appropriate, then those
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA should take notice of the fact
that in the FLSA the Congress explicitly stated that an employee is protected from
retaliation from an employer even if the accusatory information could have been
given directly to an employer. 96 Therefore, in King v. Marriott International
Incorporated, the fourth circuit correctly analogized ERISA and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, but the court misinterpreted the scope of protection afforded by the
act, while simultaneously conflating the language in the anti-retaliation provision of
ERISA. 97
91. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (3) (2010).
92. King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4 h Cir. 2003).
93. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (2) (2010) (allowing for protection for someone
who reports information to an employer, the Federal Government, or the attorney general of his or her State).
94. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974) (In the anti-retaliation
provision of ERISA, the Congress refers to protection for any employee who has given information or has
testified in a proceeding) (emphasis added).
95. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
96. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (2010).
97. This is especially clear after the amendment to the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA which slices
the language more finely to demonstrate the protection for an employee who gives information and one who
testifies in an inquiry or proceeding.
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The Second Circuit: Nicolaou v. Horizon Media Incorporated (2005)
In 2005, the second circuit had a similar opportunity to interpret the proper
scope and meaning of the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA statute.98 In that
case, Chrystina Nicolaou had formerly worked for Horizon Media as the director of
human resources and administration.99 In this capacity, Nicolaou served as a
fiduciary trustee of Horizon's 401 (k) employee benefits plan, which is regulated by
ERISA.100 Shortly after Nicolaou began working for Horizon, she "discovered a
serious payroll discrepancy involving underpayment of overtime to all non-exempt
employees of the [New York City] and Los Angeles offices."101 She further noticed
that this discrepancy had been in existence for nearly a decade, and in fact resulted
in what amounted to a historical under funding of the company's plan.102 Nicolaou
immediately brought the discrepancy to the attention of the company's Chief
Financial Officer, Jerry Riley, who advised Nicolaou to let the matter drop. 103 She
subsequently raised the issue on two separate occasions with Stewart Linder, the
company's Controller, who refused to address the matter. 104
Shortly thereafter, in October of 1999, Nicolaou became convinced that
Horizon was not going to attempt to remedy the discrepancies in their finances
which constituted violations of the ERISA statute.10 5 Upon coming to this
realization, Nicolaou contacted one of the company's in-house attorneys in the
hopes that this would cause Horizon to take the matter more seriously and rectify
the problem.106 The attorney who Nicolaou contacted expressed deep concern at the
gravity of the matter, lending credence to Nicolaou's inclination that the activities
of the company might amount to serious ERISA violations.107 The company's
attorney later confirmed his fears regarding the ERISA violations and further
investigated the matter on his own. os In November of 1999 Nicolaou and the
company's attorney met with the president of the company. 109 It is unclear from the
amended complaint who initiated this meeting, but it was clearly arranged to
discuss the existence of the payroll discrepancy, and to urge the company's
president to rectify the situation.110 According to Nicolaou, the president of
Horizon did not make any type of commitment to rectify the situation during the
course of the meeting, but rather appeared disturbed that this information was being
98. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005).
99. Id at 326.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id
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brought to his attention.111
Within days of this meeting, the president of the company announced that he
was going to bring in a "real" human resources professional who would report
directly to him.112 Shortly thereafter, Nicolaou was advised that her position had
been assigned to someone else and that her job title from that point on would be
"office manager." At that point, Horizon had not yet hired someone to replace
Nicolaou, but subsequently hired two individuals to take her former position.114
Finally, Nicolaou was terminated from her employment with Horizon on November
7, 2000.115 Nicolaou filed the case in federal court, alleging that the termination
violated sections 15 and 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act along with section 510,
the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA.116 The district court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed both claims, noting with regard to the ERISA claim
that section 510 of the ERISA statute does not protect an employee who participates
in an internal inquiry, "[and because Nicolaou] has not alleged that she participated
in a protected activity, [she] therefore has failed to state a cause of action under
ERISA."1 17
In determining the merits of the district court's ruling denying Nicolaou's
ERISA claim, the second circuit analogized the anti-retaliation provision of the
ERISA statute with a similar provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act as well as a
comparable provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.118 In formulating
this determination, the second circuit did not have the benefit of the FLSA
provision that separates protection for an employee who gives information
regarding a violation and one who participates in an inquiry or proceeding, as this
amendment was not enacted until 2010.119 Rather, the second circuit analogized
ERISA's anti-retaliation provision to the FLSA section 215(a)(3) which makes it
unlawful "to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding."120 In determining whether or not this language only applied
to formal complaints, and further analogizing this meaning with the language in the
anti-retaliation provision of ERISA, the second circuit looked to its decision in
Lambert v. Genesee Hospital.121 In that case, the court held that section 15(a)(3) of
It1. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 326-327.
115. Id. at 327.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. But see King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4 h Cir. 2003) (although this provision of
the Civil Rights Act is, admittedly, similar to both the FLSA and ERISA, the second circuit accurately
depicted the FLSA and ERISA to be more similar in both purpose and language than the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
119. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (2010).
120. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1938).
121. Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993) as cited in Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.,
402 F.3d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2005).
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the FLSA does not apply to retaliation taken in response to internal, unsolicited
complaints to management, but rather, it only applies to retaliation taken in
response to a formal testimony in some type of investigation.122 The central
reasoning behind that contention was a comparison with section 704(a) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964123 The provision relied upon in that case states,
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter."'I24
There, the court determined that the language in the Civil Rights Act which
refers to an employee who "opposed any practice" encompasses an individual's
internal complaints to management, regardless of whether he or she files a formal
charge. The court contrasted that language with the language employed by the
FLSA's whistle-blower provision that, according to the court, "limits the cause of
action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or
testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor."l25
The district court in Nicolaou asserted that it could find no meaningful
difference between the FLSA's whistle blower provision and the anti-retaliation
provision of the ERISA statute.126 Following the second circuit decision in
Lambert, therefore, the district court concluded that "the inquiry contemplated by
section 510 can only be formal, external inquiry."l27 The second circuit was not
persuaded by this simplistic reading of the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA
statute. m Rather, the court determined that the district court focused too
exclusively on the term "proceeding" in section 510 of ERISA's phrase any
"inquiry or proceeding."l29 The second circuit did not agree with the strict analogy
between the whistle blower's provision of the FLSA affording protection for any
person who "has filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to" the FLSA and ERISA's anti-retaliation provision
which applies, according to the second circuit, to any "inquiry or proceeding."l 30
Namely, the circuit court took issue with the formality that is implied by the term
"proceeding," and what the court interpreted as an oversight by the district court of
122. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2005).
123. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -3(a) (2006).
124. Id.
125. Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993) as cited in Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.,
402 F.3d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2005).
126. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2005).
127. Id quoting Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 2003 WL 22852680 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
128. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 2005).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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the fact that an "inquiry" refers to a much more informal procedure.131 The court
read this use of the term "inquiry" along with the more formal "proceeding" as
indicative of Congressional intent to encompass protection for those involved in an
informal gathering of information.132 The court went on to discuss the differences
in definitions between the two words.133 Moreover, the court asserted that it
presumed that the Congress intended that its statutory text be read in accordance
with its plain meaning, further noting, "we presume that none of the language
enacted by Congress is superfluous."l 34 The second circuit therefore concluded that
the language of the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA goes beyond the scope of
that employed in the FLSA, extending to less formal "inquiries" such as that
involved in Nicolaou's case. 135 The court, therefore, determined that if Nicolaou
had been contacted to partake in the meeting with the company's attorney and the
company's president, her actions would be insulated from any threat of retaliation
under section 510 of ERISA. Thus, the court reversed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint and remanded the case for more accurate findings of fact with
regard to the genesis of the meeting between Nicolaou, Horizon's attorney, and
Horizon's president.136
While this court did more accurately characterize the spirit of the anti-
retaliation provision of ERISA in determining that the inquiry or proceeding need
not be excessively formal, I believe that the court ignored the plain interpretation of
"gives information" found in ERISA. Furthermore, because Congress amended the
anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA in March of 2010, the court had a less than
ideal portion of the FLSA with which to analogize the anti-retaliation provision of
ERISA. The court correctly characterized ERISA section 510 as being broader than
section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA.137 However, since Nicolaou, Congress has enacted a
more analogous section of the FLSA, section 218c, which clears up any lingering
misunderstanding as to the meaning of the language of section 510 of ERISA. In
section 218c of the FLSA, Congress separates into subsections protection for
employees who provide information about a potential violation and those who
testify in a proceeding regarding the allegations.' 3 8 Similarly, the anti-retaliation
provision of ERISA contains language indicating that a person is insulated from
employer retaliation if he or she merely "given information" regarding an alleged
violation of ERISA. 139
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (Noting that the Black's Law Dictionary 1241 (8'b ed.) defines "proceeding" as "the regular and
orderly progression of a lawsuit," and "[a]ny procedural measure for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency
and an "inquiry" as merely a "request for information).
134. Id.
135. Id. (Notably, this case was rendered before the 2010 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which separates the language of the anti-retaliation provision such that a person who gives information is
considered as a separate subcategory from one who testifies in an inquiry or proceeding. Based on this newer
separation, it is more obvious that Congress meant to protect both classes of individuals in the FLSA).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (2010).
139. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A § 1140 (2006).
1432012]
Journal ofLegislation
As the second circuit in Nicolaou aptly notes, the plain meaning of
Congressional language should be examined when making judicial interpretations
thereof. 140 Furthermore, no language employed by Congress should be deemed
superfluous, but rather, all language employed should be examined and considered
when interpreting Congressional statutes.141 Therefore, it is enigmatic that the
second circuit failed to discuss the language immediately preceding that which
discusses protection from retaliation for information disclosed in an "inquiry or
proceeding" which simply states that an employee is safeguarded from retaliatory
acts on the part of his or her employer any time that he or she "gives information"
relating to ERISA violations.142 At the very core, Nicolaou's reporting of ERISA
violations to her supervisors is giving them information regarding such violations.
Thus, regardless of the nature of the inquiry or proceeding, although I believe that
the second circuit was correct to liberally interpret that phrase, Nicolaou should
have been protected from retaliation based solely on the fact that she brought to the
attention of her supervisors what she correctly deemed to be violations of various
ERISA provisions. Furthermore, if any modem court is to analogize with an
applicable section of the FLSA, the court should look to the anti-retaliation
provision rather than the whistle blower provision which indicates that employees
who "provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide or cause to be
provided to the employer. . .information relating to any violation of.. .[the
FLSA]."l43 As in the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA statute, the anti-
retaliation provision of the FLSA, in looking at the plain meaning of the language
employed by Congress, clearly indicates that any employee who brings to the
attention of his or her employer a potential violation of the statute is protected from
retaliation by his or her employer.144
The Third Circuit: Edwards v. A. H. Cornell and Sons (2010)
The most recent opinion examining the proper interpretation of the anti-
retaliation provision of ERISA occurred in June of 2010 in front of the third
circuit. 145 The defendant in this action was a family-owned company that provided
commercial and residential construction services.146 The defendant hired the
plaintiff, Shirley Edwards, in the March of 2006 to serve as its Director of Human
Resources in order to establish a human resources department.147 As an employee
140. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 2005).
141. Id.
142. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A § 1140 (2006).
143. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.SC.A. § 218c (2010).
144. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974); Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (2010) (both indicating that any employee who gives information regarding an allegation
of non-compliance with the applicable statute is protected from any retaliatory measures due to this allegation.
It is important to note that the FLSA explicitly states that such information can be rendered directly to the
person's employer).
145. Edwards v. A. H. Comell and Sons, 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
146. Id. at 217.
147. Id
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of the company, Edwards participated in a group health insurance plan which was
governed by ERISA.148 Edwards claimed that she discovered, during the final
weeks of her employment with A. H. Cornell and Sons that A. H. Comell was
engaging in several violations of the ERISA statute. 14 9 Specifically, the company
was allegedly administering the group health plan on a discriminatory basis,
misrepresenting to some employees the cost of the group health coverage to
dissuade employees from participating in the group health insurance as well as
enrolling non-citizens into its ERISA plans by providing false social security
numbers and other similarly fraudulent information to the company's insurance
carriers.150 Upon discovering this information, Edwards "objected to and/or
complained to" management regarding these alleged ERISA violations. 151
Allegedly as a result of these complaints to management, she was terminated from
her employment with the company shortly thereafter by the people to whom she
addressed her concerns.152
Edwards brought this action in federal court alleging violations of the anti-
retaliation provision of the ERISA statute. 153 The defendants filed a 12(b)(6)
motion asserting that the plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity under
ERISA section 510. 154 After examining the circuit split previously discussed in this
paper, the district court determined that the reasoning in Nicolaou v. Horizon
Media, Inc. was persuasive to its decision and held that Edwards did, in fact, fail to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted due to the fact that her allegations
were not part of any type of "inquiry or proceeding." 5 5 The district court mainly
focused on the fact that Edwards did not allege that anyone requested the
information from her regarding the alleged ERISA violations, nor was she involved
in any type of formal or informal gathering of information.156
In examining the merits of this decision, the third circuit noted the circuit split
that forms the basis for this paper.' 5 7 The court examined the merits of the
Hashimoto decision, especially the practical conclusions of disallowing internal,
unsolicited complaints to be protected by the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA.159
Notably, the court pointed out that, "The normal first step in giving
information... [is] to present the problem first to the responsible managers of the
ERISA plan."160 In noting the merits of the next case to consider the scope of
section 510 of ERISA, the tenth circuit explained that Anderson focused mainly on
148. Id.
149. Id. at 218.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408 (9h Cir. 1993).
159. Edwards v. A. H. Cornell and Sons, 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
160. Id. at 220-222. quoting Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9 Cir. 1993).
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the fact that an employee's claim of wrongful discharge falls squarely within the
ambit of ERISA section 510 when the employee is discharged for "exercising
ERISA rights or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of ERISA rights,
as well as discharges for providing information or testimony relating to ERISA."16 1
The court then turned to the two cases that ultimately formed the basis for the
court's decision.162 In quoting King v. Marriott International, Inc. 16 the third
circuit emphasized the strictness with which the fourth circuit had interpreted the
phrase, "inquiry or proceeding" found in the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA
act.164 In explaining the reasoning behind the departure from the fifth and ninth
circuits, the court in Edwards explained that the third circuit in King did not believe
that the previous two courts that had considered this had focused on the more
"compelling interpretation of the statutory language."1 65 The court went on to
explain that the King court believed that the ninth circuit rejected this "more
compelling" interpretation for a "fair" interpretation, and that the fifth circuit
merely quoted the language of ERISA section 510 without paying apt attention to
the facial inapplicability to intra-office complaints.166 Finally, the third circuit
examined the second circuit's decision in Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 167
wherein the second circuit determined that, in order to qualify as an "inquiry or
proceeding," the employee must at minimum demonstrate that he or she had been
contacted to meet with management to give information about an alleged ERISA
violation.168
The court ultimately determined that it was more persuaded by the latter school
of thought; that the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA statute does not apply to
unsolicited, internal complaints to management regarding alleged violations of the
statute.169 In so deciding, the court did not look to the entirety of the provision, but
rather simplistically noted that "Since Edwards has undoubtedly 'given
information' by objecting and/or complaining to management, at issue in this
appeal is whether or not he did so in an 'inquiry or proceeding.""170 Edwards
argued that his complaints themselves were an inquiry, by which the court was not
persuaded. Ultimately, the third circuit determined that, because the nature of
Edward's complaints was informal, his activities did not fall within the purview of
the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA statute. The court explicitly borrowed
this under-inclusive definition from the fourth circuit in King v. Marriott
161. Id.at220-222. quoting Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., II F.3d 1311 (5 Cir. 1994).
162. See King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Nicolau v. Horizon Media Inc., 402
F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); Edwards v. A. H. Cornell & Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (all maintaining
that the plain language of § 510 of ERISA only protects against retaliation following reports that were
ascertained pursuant to an "inquiry" or "proceeding").
163. King v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003).
164. Edwards v. A. H. Cornell and Sons, 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
165. Id. at 220. quoting King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003).
166. Id. at 220.
167. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, (2d Cir. 2005).
168. Edwards v. A. H. Cornell and Sons, 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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International, Incorporated.171
However, in so holding, the most recent circuit to examine this issue failed to
discuss the most compelling interpretation for the anti-retaliation provision of the
ERISA statute: that an employee who "gives information" about an allegation of an
ERISA violation is a different employee from one who "testified or is about to
testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter." 72 In determining that
the phrase "gives information" is modified by the phrase "inquiry or proceeding,"
the third circuit only notes that other statutes, such as section 704(a) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964173, use "broader language."l 74 Specifically, the court
notes that the applicable provision of that Act provides protection for any employee
who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title
VII], 175
However, unlike the court in King v. Marriott International, Incorporated,176
the court did not look to the more analogous anti-retaliation provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. 177 Moreover, because Edwards was decided after the
Congressional amendment to the FLSA, clearing up the language in the whistle-
blower provision therein, it was the first case equipped with the most applicable
version of that provision with which to analogize section 510 of ERISA. In the
FLSA's newly enacted anti-retaliation provision, Congress used nearly identical
language as was embodied in the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA statute.178
In both provisions, Congress grants protection for any "employee" who has
provided "information" "relating to" the applicable provision of the act.179
Furthermore, each of the provisions provides protection for employees who testify
in a proceeding wherein the employee discusses allegations of violations of the
respective Act.180 The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA provides the most
171. See King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that, in order to receive
protection from employer retaliation following an allegation of an ERISA violation pursuant to § 510 of the
statute, the allegation must have come about following a formal inquiry or proceeding, or at least "something
more formal than written or oral complaints made to a supervisor.")
172. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974) (explaining the
instances in which an employee is protected from retaliation from an employer subsequent to the employee
exposing the employer's alleged ERISA violations.)
173. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -3(a) (1969).
174. Edwards v. A. H. Cornell and Sons, 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010).
175. Id. quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -3(a) (1969).
176. King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003).
177. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (a)(2) & (3) (2010).
178. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974).
179. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974) ("It shall be unlawful to
discharge, fine, suspend, expel or discriminate against any person because he has given information. . relating
to this chapter."); The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (a)(2) & (3) (2010) ("No employer shall
discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee.. because the employee
has.. .provided.. information relating to any violation of. . any provision of this title.")
180. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974) ("It shall be unlawful to
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he.. has testified or is about to
testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter."); The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §
218c (a)(2) & (3) (2010) ("No employer shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any
employee. . because the employee has. . testified or is about to testify in a proceeding concerning such
violation.")
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clearly analogous provision for the purposes of properly interpreting the language
employed in the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA. Therefore, the most important
point to note is the fact that in the FLSA, Congress separated into subsections
protection for employees who give information regarding violations of the FLSA
and protection for those who testify in a proceeding regarding such allegations.181
Furthermore, Congress afforded, in the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA,
protection for employees who provide information about such violations to his or
her employer. 182 Although the protection from retaliation that is granted to
employees who give information regarding ERISA violations and that for
employees who testify in an inquiry or proceeding is not separated into subsections
in ERISA section 510, the two are conceptually separated by the word "or." 183
When viewed in conjunction with her sister provision in the FLSA, the legislative
intent behind the wording in the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA becomes much
more apparent. Congress physically separated the two types of protection in the
FLSA, but practically, this separation is not only present, but necessary for
enforcement of ERISA in the anti-retaliation provision therein. Thus, King,
Nicolaou, and Edwards were all incorrectly decided due to the fact that King,
Nicolaou, and Edwards were all insulated from retaliation merely by the fact that
they "[gave] information" regarding alleged ERISA violations. 184 At that moment,
the anti-retaliation provision should have been in effect, especially when read in
conjunction with its newly-enacted sister provision in the FLSA.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE LACK OF CONSISTENT
ENFORCEMENT AND ABILITY FOR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE ANTI-RETALIATION
PROVISIONS OF ERISA
In addition to the fact that the plain language of the statute, when properly
understood, allows protection for employees who merely give information to an
employer regarding potential ERISA violations, the policy-based underpinnings of
ERISA lend credence to the notion that the anti-retaliation provision of the ERISA
statute should apply to unsolicited, internal complaints to management. According
to the Congressional findings and declaration of policy dictated in the United States
Code preceding ERISA, Congress enacted the ERISA provisions because:
The Congress [found] that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of
employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that
the operational scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly
interstate; that the continued well-being and security of millions of
181. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (a)(2) & (3) (2010).
182. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218c (a)(2) (2010).
183. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974).
184. See King v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Nicolau v. Horizon Media Inc., 402
F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); Edwards v. A. H. Cornell & Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (all maintaining
that the plain language of § 510 of ERISA only protects against retaliation following reports that were
ascertained pursuant to an "inquiry" or "proceeding").
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employees and their dependents [were] directly affected by these plans;
that they are affected with a national public interest; that they have become
an important factor affecting the stability of employment. . . that they have
become an important factor in commerce because of the interstate character
of their activities, and of the activities of their participants, and the
employers, employee organizations, and other entities by which they are
established or maintained; . . . that owing to the lack of employee
information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to
provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that
disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the
establishment, operation, and administration ofsuch plans; . .. that despite
the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of
employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of
vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current
minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to
the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated,
employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated
benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States,
and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be
provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial
soundness. 1s
These policy considerations, while noble, cannot be effectively implemented if
the Act is not enforced in every applicable circumstance. The lack of consistent or
effective enforcement of the Pension Plans Disclosure Act served as a catalyst for
both the House and the Senate to respond to the many loopholes apparent in the
previously mentioned Act.186 These loopholes became glaringly apparent following
the Studebaker automobile debacle, rendering thousands upon thousands of workers
devoid of their hard-earned pensions and other previously promised compensation
for their years on the job. Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision in a similarly
lax fashion reinstates the issues associated with ERISA's predecessor. Unequal or
ineffective enforcement cannot be tolerated if this Act is to fulfill the Congressional
goals of adequately safeguarding the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries. ss Thus, in order to effectuate the legislative purpose that marked the
catalyst for the enactment of ERISA, as well as to remain faithful to the plain
185. Employee Retirement Income Security Program Protection of Employee Benefit Rights General
Provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (emphasis added).
186. PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT
OF 1974 (ERISA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 7-5700. Available at
www.crs.gov (2009).
187. Id.
188. Employee Retirement Income Security Program Protection of Employee Benefit Rights General
Provisions, 29 U.S.C. §1001.
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language and the clearly analogous provision in the FLSA that Congress enacted in
2010, the anti-retaliation of ERISA must be read to include protection for
employees who deliver unsolicited, internal complaints to managers and employers.
